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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate which factors determine the use of a special purpose company (SPC) by a sponsoring company and 
whether those determinants differ before and after IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) adoption. 
Using financial data from Korean listed companies, our results indicate that use of an SPC is associated with financial 
reporting incentives (e.g., lowering leverage) and economic benefits (e.g., fundraising). However, the effect of 
leverage on the use of SPCs is not significant after the adoption of the IFRS. These results suggest that, although 
companies are generally motivated to use SPCs for both financial reporting and economic purposes, only economic 
motivation influences the use of SPCs after IFRS adoption. This implies that the regulation for reporting an SPC’s 
consolidated financial statement under IFRS plays a role in decreasing the use of SPCs for financial reporting 
discretion. We extend the prior literature on SPCs by documenting the effects of IFRS adoption on the determinants 
of the use of SPCs.  
 
Keywords: Special Purpose Company (SPC), Consolidated Financial Statement, Off-Balance Sheet Financing, 
Discretionary Financial Reporting 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
e investigate the factors that determine the use of a special purpose company (SPC) by a sponsoring 
company and whether those determinants differ before and after IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards) adoption. The K-IFRS (Korean International Financial Reporting Standards) 
define an SPC1 as a legally distinct entity introduced to carry out a narrow, predefined activity for a sponsoring 
company. Previous literature on the use of SPCs documents that sponsoring companies use SPCs to more easily 
securitize financial assets (Thomas, 1999; Gorton & Souleles, 2007). For example, a sponsoring company sells 
financial assets to an SPC, which purchases the financial assets through the issuance of new securities, mainly asset 
backed securities (ABS). Thus, SPCs are intended as instruments that can allow sponsoring companies to more easily 
acquire outside financing. That is, the use of an SPC can positively influence the sponsoring company’s firm value by 
allowing it to raise capital at a lower borrowing cost and without reporting debt.  
 
However, SPCs might also be used by sponsoring companies to disguise the sponsor’s financial statements. Enron 
used SPCs to hide very large losses from its financial statements by taking advantage of legally separate entity status 
(Powers 2002). 
 
It is important to investigate companies’ incentives for using SPCs because the economic consequences could vary 
according to the sponsoring firm’s motivation, economic benefits, or financial reporting discretion. First, sponsoring 
companies could use an SPC to improve their capital structure or obtain tax benefits. SPCs have economic benefits 
																																								 																				
1 A special purpose company (SPC) is also called a special purpose vehicle or special purpose entity. 
W 
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for sponsoring companies by serving the legitimate business purpose of raising capital at a lower borrowing cost2. 
Many studies document the wealth effects of SPCs (Rosenthal & Ocampo, 1988; John & John, 1991; Schwarcz, 1994; 
Lockwood, Rutherford & Herrera, 1996), arguing that SPCs are useful for raising funds and thus contribute to optimal 
firm capital structure. In addition, SPCs are used frequently for tax purposes, mostly for optimal allocation of tax 
benefits among the investor classes (Korean Financial Supervisory Service, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, using SPCs with financial reporting motivation, as Enron did, would harm investors by hiding 
information on firm value. Enron’s collapse in the early 2000 is often presented as a typical example of such a misuse 
of SPCs.  
 
K-IFRS regulations specify that SPCs should be consolidated into the sponsor’s financial statement, which should 
remove the motivation to create SPCs for the purpose of financial statement discretion. Since adoption of the IFRS, 
sponsoring companies should use SPCs just for the purpose of economic benefits (i.e., raising capital and tax 
incentives). The Korean Financial Supervisory Service reports that the number of SPCs has not decreased since the 
IFRS was adopted in 2011, suggesting that sponsoring companies still use SPCs to raise funds and obtain tax benefits.  
 
We develop a hypothesis about whether the use of SPCs is motivated by both financial reporting and economic benefits 
in the Korean market. We form a second hypothesis about the different motivations before and after IFRS adoption. 
More specifically, we conjecture that, since the adoption of the IFRS, the use of SPCs is not associated with financial 
reporting motivation and is driven by economic motivation.  
 
Using a sample of Korean companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchanges (KSE) and KOSDAQ market from 2004 
to 2014, we find evidence that sponsors use SPCs for both financial reporting and economic purposes. However, the 
relationship between the use of SPCs and financial reporting motivation is not significant after the adoption of IFRS. 
These results imply that financial reporting discretion through the use of SPCs is no longer available after the adoption 
of the IFRS because sponsoring companies must now consolidate SPCs into their financial statements. 
 
We extend the literature in several ways. We document the determinants of the use of SPCs and also the effects of 
IFRS adoption in changing those determinants. In particular, our investigation of the role of regulation is differentiated 
from previous studies on the analysis under non-IFRS conditions. Our findings show the loss of motivation for 
financial reporting discretion after sponsoring companies applied the IFRS, which suggests that the IFRS regulation 
plays a crucial role in undermining the motivation for improper use of SPCs. Finally, this study adds to the literature 
on the consequences to the accounting environment of IFRS adoption. 
 
The rest of paper is consisted as follows. Section II provides background and hypothesis development. Section III 
describes the sample and empirical model, and Section IV reports the results of the empirical tests. In Section V, we 
conclude and suggest future research. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 What is an SPC? 
 
K-IFRS defines an SPC as a legally separate entity created to perform designated transactions for a sponsoring 
company. SPCs have been used in the forms of a limited partnership, a limited liability company, or a trust for various 
financial arrangements. However, they have been used most frequently in asset securitization transactions (Hodge 
1998).  
 
Figure 1 shows a typical SPC formation for asset securitization. A sponsor creates an SPC to carry out transactions of 
circumscribed activities and sells assets to the SPC (Gorton & Souleles, 2007). Then the SPC raises capital through 
the issuance of ABS. Using those funds, the SPC purchases assets from the sponsor, who guarantees the SPC’s debt 
to the lender. 
																																								 																				
2 The assets of an SPC are not legally associated with the sponsoring company’s bankruptcy risk (Feng et al. 2009). 
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Figure 1. Forming a Typical Special Purpose Company (SPC)3 
 
 
 
2.2 Prior Studies and Hypotheses 
 
Previous studies have examined the effect of SPCs’ financial statements and the usefulness of SPCs in raising funds. 
The literature focuses largely on the wealth effects of SPCs and how SPCs can contribute to optimal firm capital 
structure (Schwarcz, 1994; Rosenthal & Ocampo, 1988; John & John, 1991; Lockwood et al. 1996). Recent research 
emphasizes the extent of off-balance-sheet financing and the capital market reaction to SPCs (Shevlin, 1987; Beatty, 
Berger & Magliolo, 1995; Calomiris & Mason, 2004; Karaoglu, 2005; Mills & Newberry, 2005; Feng, Gramlich & 
Gupta, 2009; Dechow, Myers & Shakespeare, 2010; Barth, Ormazabal & Taylor, 2011). However, there is no 
consensus on the primary determinants for the use of an SPC in the Korean market. Thus, it remains an open question 
which factors mainly affect the use of SPCs in Korea. SPCs are usually created under the ABS (Asset-Backed 
Securitization) Act in Korea, which addresses SPCs’ inherent risk. To protect investors, the ABS Act allows only 
sponsors with good credit to create SPCs. 
 
To reduce the risk of an SPC, the sponsor guarantees the SPC’s loans or agrees to incur underlying losses that result 
from the assets moved to the SPC (Calomiris & Mason, 2004; Higgins & Mason, 2004; Gorton & Souleles, 2007). 
However, the SPC’s assets and liabilities are not legally associated with the sponsor’s bankruptcy risk. Therefore, the 
SPC allows the sponsor to raise funds at lower borrowing costs because the sponsoring company’s substantial control 
of the SPC makes the SPC a low credit risk. Furthermore, SPCs are an easy way for sponsors to raise funds because 
the sponsors can choose assets that correspond to investors’ risk preferences when they transfer assets to SPCs (Feng 
et al. 2009). 
 
Sponsors frequently create SPCs as flow-through entities to share tax benefits with investors. In the United States, an 
SPC is used as a form of partnership to reduce income taxes because the SPC is subject to only a single level 
(shareholder level) of tax (Feng et al. 2009). Similarly, in Korea, SPCs are used to reduce income tax because they 
are not subject to the corporate level of tax. When SPCs distribute at least 90 percent of their distributable profits, that 
amount is deducted from the amount of income4 while corporations are subject to two levels of taxation (corporate 
and shareholder levels). Furthermore, prior studies show that companies extensively create flow-through entities for 
the purpose of tax planning (Fox & Luna, 2005).  
 
Collectively, sponsors are thus motivated to create SPCs for economic benefits such as raising capital at lower 
borrowing costs or allocating tax benefits. 
 
																																								 																				
3 ABS practical guidance (Korean Financial Supervisory Service. 2012. 8)  
4 Korean corporate tax act article 51-2. 
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We also expect that sponsors are motivated to create SPCs for financial reporting discretion. The sponsor manages its 
financial statements in terms of timing and amount of debt. Because the sponsor defines the SPC’s activities and 
contract details in advance, it can control the SPC’s transactions and obtain the best balance of risks and rewards 
(Weidner, 1999; Berardino, 2001; Soroosh & Ciesielski, 2004)5.  
 
Based on the above discussion, we predict that SPCs are used for both financial reporting motivation and economic 
motivation and we develop the hypothesis as follows. 
 
H1: The use of SPCs is motivated by both financial reporting discretion and economic benefits. 
 
A sponsor can use an SPC for financial reporting discretion when the SPC’s financial statements are excluded from 
consolidation with the sponsor’s financial statements. As presented in Table 1, however, K-IFRS does not exclude 
SPCs from consolidation into their sponsors’ financial statements. Accordingly, sponsoring companies must report 
consolidated financial statements that include their SPCs, which implies that the use of SPCs for financial reporting 
discretion is ineffective since the adoption of the IFRS.  
 
 
Table 1. Consolidation scope before and after adoption of IFRS 
 K-GAAP (before adoption of IFRS) K-IFRS 
Consolidation scope A company which has the total assets at the end of 
the immediately preceding business year falls 
short of the amount of tem billion won or less shall 
be deemed not to be included in the scope of 
subsidiary companies and so on. 
All subsidiary companies 
Exception for SPC  SPC shall not to be included in the scope of 
subsidiary companies. 
No exception 
 
 
Even though accounting regulations have changed, the Korean Financial Supervisory Service reports that the number 
of SPCs has not decreased since IFRS adoption. This implies that sponsoring companies still employ SPCs for their 
economic benefits of raising funds and obtaining tax benefits. 
 
This suggests that IFRS adoption might influence the determinants for the use of SPCs, thus, we conjecture that the 
determinants for using SPCs differ before and after IFRS adoption. Specifically, the sponsor’s motivation to use SPCs 
for financial reporting discretion would be attenuated during the post-IFRS period. Therefore, we develop the second 
hypothesis as follows.  
 
H2: The use of SPCs has not been motivated by financial reporting discretion since the adoption of the IFRS. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
Our sample consists of 15,068 firm-year observations listed on the KSE or KOSDAQ from 2004 to 2014. We exclude 
companies in the financial industry due to inherent differences in their regulatory and institutional structures. Also, 
we use sponsoring companies with SPCs established under the ABS Act due to limitations in data collection6. 
 
Table 2 represents a distribution of our sample by year and by industry. Panel A shows the frequency and extent of 
the using SPC during the sample period. The number of sponsoring companies belonging to industries with SPCs is 
																																								 																				
5 Until 2003, the U.S. GAAP allowed an SPC’s financial statements to be excluded from consolidation into the sponsor’s financial statements when 
the third-party residual equity investment was equal to at least 3 percent of the SPC’s total capitalization. K-GAAP also permitted the exclusion of 
SPCs from the sponsor firm’s financial statements. 
6	In Korea, sponsors can create SPCs under commercial law and the Asset-Backed Securitization Act (ABS Act). Some terms to protect investors, 
such as income deductions and limitations of originator (financial institutions, public enterprise, and corporations of good credit) apply to SPCs 
intended to facilitate asset securitization under the ABS Act.	
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8,217 firm-years, approximately 55% of the total observations. The number of companies with SPCs is 53, which is 
0.35% of the full observations and 0.65% of the observations in industries with at least one SPC. After IFRS adoption 
in 2011, the mean value of companies with at least one SPC decreases from 5.29 to 47, while the mean and median of 
SPCs per sponsoring company increase8. 
 
Panel B shows the distribution of our sample across the industry categories. The use of SPCs is frequent among the 
industry groups of air transport, telecommunications, and construction. Since the adoption of the IFRS, only 
companies in the industry groups of air transport, water transport, telecommunications, and manufacturing of non-
metallic mineral products have used SPCs. Compared with the pre-IFRS adoption period, the mean value increases 
from 1.309 to 3.38, indicating that SPC use is concentrated in certain industries. 
 
In summary, since the adoption of the IFRS, companies in certain industry groups use SPCs, although the number of 
companies with SPC decreased10. 
 
 
Table 2. Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year 
No. of 
Observations 
No. of Observations 
of Companies in 
industries with SPC 
No. of 
Companies 
with SPC 
Percent of Companies 
with SPC 
No. of SPCs per 
sponsoring company  
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(1) (3)/(2) Mean Median 
2004 1,174 642 7 0.60% 1.09% 1.71 1.00 
2005 1,244 682 5 0.40% 0.73% 1.20 1.00 
2006 1,297 702 5 0.39% 0.71% 1.00 1.00 
2007 1,352 732 6 0.44% 0.82% 1.00 1.00 
2008 1,364 738 2 0.15% 0.27% 1.00 1.00 
2009 1,389 768 6 0.43% 0.78% 1.50 1.00 
2010 1,387 764 6 0.43% 0.79% 1.33 1.00 
2011 1,400 763 2 0.14% 0.26% 2.00 2.00 
2012 1,453 795 5 0.34% 0.63% 2.60 1.00 
2013 1,501 811 5 0.33% 0.62% 3.40 2.00 
2014 1,507 820 4 0.27% 0.49% 5.00 6.00 
 15,068 8,217 53 0.35% 0.65% 1.92 1.00 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
  
																																								 																				
7 The mean of companies with at least one SPC between 2004 and 2010 is 5.29, and the mean of companies with at least one SPC between 2011 
and 2014 is 4. 
8 The mean (median) of SPCs per sponsoring company is 1.25 (1.00) between 2004 and 2010 and 3.25 (2.75) between 2011 and 2014. 
9 The mean of SPCs among firm-years with SCPs presented in Table 2 is defined as the total number of SPCs divided by the number of observations 
with at least one SPC before and after the adoption of IFRS. The total numbers of SPCs before adoption, after adoption, and in the whole sample 
period are 48, 54, and 102, respectively. 
10 For instance, the number of companies with SPCs in the telecommunications industry increases from 4 to 7 after adoption of the IFRS. The 
Korean Financial Supervisory Service reports that asset securitizations of receivables for phone devices increase through increased demand for 
smartphones. 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry Categories by IFRS adoption 
 All Pre_IFRS Post_IFRS 
Industry Categories No. of Observations 
No. of 
Observations 
with SPC 
No. of 
Observations 
with SPC 
Mean of  
SPCs per 
sponsoring 
company 
No. of 
Observations 
with SPC 
Mean of 
SPCs per 
sponsoring 
company 
Air Transport 22 12 6 2.00 6 2.67 
Telecommunications 125 11 4 1.50 7 5.00 
Construction 491 5 5 1.40   
Water Transport 49 5 3 1.33 2 1.00 
Manufacture of 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Medicinal Chemicals 
and Botanical Products 
829 4 4 1.00   
Manufacture of 
Electronic Components, 
Computer, Radio, 
Television and 
Communication 
Equipment and 
Apparatuses 
2150 3 3 1.00   
Manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical 
products except 
pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemicals 
942 2 2 1.00   
Manufacture of Basic 
Metal Products 780 2 2 1.00   
Manufacture of 
electrical equipment 523 2 2 1.00   
Professional Services 675 2 2 1.00   
Manufacture of Food 
Products 451 1 1 1.00   
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, Clothing 
Accessories and Fur 
Articles 
222 1 1 1.00   
Manufacture of Rubber 
and Plastic Products 369 1 1 1.00   
Manufacture of Other 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
325 1   1 1.00 
Manufacture of 
Medical, Precision and 
Optical Instruments, 
Watches and Clocks 
264 1 1 1.00   
 8,217 53 37 1.30 16 3.38 
 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
For the test model to investigate the determinants of the use of SPCs, we refer to Feng et al. (2009). They estimate a 
Tobit model with financial reporting variables, economic variables, and control variables. 
 
We use the number of SPCs (SPC_NUM) and a dummy variable for SPCs (SPC_DUM) as dependent variables. We 
estimate the Tobit specification because SPC_NUM is greater than zero, which means the dependent variable is left-
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censored (Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2003). Also, we estimate the logit model when we use SPC_DUM as another 
proxy for the use of SPCs.  
 
Our model is specified as follows. 
 𝑆𝑃𝐶$,& = 𝛼 + 𝛽+𝐿𝐸𝑉$,&/+ + 𝛽0𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑉$,&/+ + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆$,&8+ + 𝛽9𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝐼𝑆𝑆$,&8+ + 𝛽;𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾$,&/+ +𝛽=𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷$,&/+ + 𝛽@𝐸𝑇𝑅$,&/+ + 𝛽A𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁$,&/+ + 𝛽C𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷$,&/+ + 𝛽+D𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐻$,&/+ + +𝛽++𝐿𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&/+ +𝛽+0𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶$,&/+ + 𝛽I 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀$,&00+4 + 𝜖$,&  (1) 
 
We include the leverage ratio (LEV) and the ratio of operating income to interest expense (INTCOV) as proxies for 
the closeness to debt covenant violations as the financial reporting motivation. We also use variables of financing 
from outside investors (DEBTISS and STOCKISS) as financial reporting variables. We use firm-specific risk (RISK), 
accessibility of internal funds (FUND), repayable funds (CLTD), and tax incentives (ETR and INTAN) as proxies for 
economic motivation. The control variables are board characteristics (DIRIND, INDSH), firm size (LnSIZE), and 
industry practice (INDU PERC). We include year dummies (YEAR) to capture year effects. 
 
For the independent variables, we use one year preceding data to minimize endogeneity concerns. However, for the 
variables of financing from outside investors (DEBTISS and STOCKISS), we measure at t+1 as a proxy for 
management incentive to manage financial statements discretionally before raising funds from outside investors. 
Table 3 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in our model.  
 
 
Table 3. Variable Definitions 
 Variable Definition Predicted sign 
Dependent 
Variables 
SPC_NUM The number of SPC  
SPC_DUM Company with SPCs is 1, otherwise 0  
Independent 
Variables: 
Financial Reporting 
Motivations 
LEV Total debt/ total assets + 
INTCOV Operating income/interest expense - 
DEBTISS Δlong-term debt / average total assets + 
STOCKISS Δcommon and preferred stock / average total assets + 
Independent 
Variables: 
Economic 
Motivations 
RISK The decile of the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the year ? 
FUND Cash flow from operating and investing activities/ average total assets - 
CLTD Debt in current liabilities / total assets + 
ETR Income tax expense / total pretax income + 
INTAN Intangible assets / total assets + 
Control Variables 
DIRIND The percentage of independent directors in the Board  ? 
INDSH Independent directors’ shareholding ratio ? 
LnSIZE ln(market value of common shares and preferred stock and the book value of liabilities) + 
INDU_PERC Percent of companies with SPCs for each industry-year + 
 
 
Companies have to meet minimum financial requirements to avoid violation of lending arrangements. We use LEV, 
as a proxy for the closeness to a debt covenant violation, which is calculated as total debt divided by total assets and 
INTCOV, which is calculated as the ratio of operating income to interest expense (Press & Weintrop, 1990; Duke & 
Hunt 1990; Dichev & Skinner 2002), as a second financial reporting variable. We expect the use of SPCs to increase 
with LEV and decrease with INTCOV. 
 
Companies also have motivation to perform earnings management to attract external financing (Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney, 1996). Consistent with this notion, companies usually engage in earnings management before capital 
issuances (Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998). Therefore, we use DEBTISS, defined as the increase in debt in year t+1, and 
STOCKISS, the net stock issuances in year t+1, both divided by average total assets, as financial reporting variables 
to represent companies’ incentives to manage their financial statements in the previous year of financing from outside 
investors. We expect both variables to be positive. 
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Sponsors transfer an asset or group of assets with similar risks to SPCs to meet the demands of investors with specific 
risk preferences. Sponsors might sell more (fewer) risky assets to SPCs when they are seeking finance from risk-
taking (averse) investors (Beatty et al. 1995). Hence, we do not predict the sign of the coefficient for RISK, defined 
as the decile of standard deviations of all companies’ daily stock returns, as an economic variable to capture 
management incentive to remove risky assets and liabilities to SPCs.  
 
Also, we use the variables of internal fund availability (FUND) and repayable funds (CLTD) (Beatty et al., 1995) 
because companies will use SPCs when internal funding is tight. FUND is calculated as the sum of cash flow from 
operating activity and investing activity deflated by average total assets. CLTD is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debt due within one year to total assets. We predict that using SPCs will decrease with FUND and increase with 
CLTD. 
 
Companies engage in tax planning using flow-through entities to share tax benefits with investors (Fox & Luna 2005). 
Flow-through entities are subject to only a shareholder level of tax, whereas corporations are subject to both corporate 
and shareholder levels of tax (Feng et al. 2009). In Korea, when companies distribute at least 90 percent of the 
distributable profits of SPCs, that amount is deducted from the amount of income (Korean corporate tax act article 51-
2). Therefore, we use ETR, defined as the sum of income tax expenses divided by pretax income, as the proxy for tax 
incentives. Also, companies shift income generated from intangibles into low-tax regions (Dischinger & Riedel 2011). 
Thus, we include INTAN, defined as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, as a proxy for tax incentives. We 
predict the use of SPCs to increase with ETR and INTAN. 
 
We include board characteristics as control variables. We use DIRIND, calculated as the ratio of independent directors 
in the board, and INDSH, independent directors’ shareholding ratio, as a proxy of the independence of board members 
associated with earnings management (Larcker, Richardson & Tuna, 2007). Prior research shows that, as a board’s 
number of independent directors increases, its monitoring becomes more effective, it better aligns the interests of 
shareholders and managers (Byrd & Hickman 1992; Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1994), and shareholder value increases 
(Klein 1998). 
 
We also control for firm size (LnSIZE), industry practice (INDU_PERC), and year. We use LnSIZE, which is 
calculated as the natural log of the market value of equity and the book value of debt, as a control variable. Because 
larger companies are more likely to have experts to deal with complicated finance arrangements, we expect the use of 
SPCs to increase with LnSIZE. INDU_PERC captures industry practice, calculated as the ratio of companies with at 
least one SPC by industry and year. To the extent that using SPCs is likely to be affected by industry practices, we 
predict the use of SPCs to increase with INDU_PERC. Finally, to capture other systematic economy-wide effects, we 
include year dummies (YEAR). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables. The mean value of SPC_NUM after the adoption of the 
IFRS is higher than that before IFRS adoption, whereas the mean value of SPC_DUM is lower after IFRS adoption 
than it was before. Thus, although the number of companies using SPCs decreases after IFRS adoption, those 
companies use more SPCs than they did in the pre-IFRS adoption period. The mean (median) of LEV indicates no 
prominent difference before and after IFRS adoption. The means (medians) of INTCOV, DEBTISS, and STOCKISS 
after IFRS adoption are lower than those before IFRS adoption. However, the means (medians) of DIRIND and 
INDSH after IFRS adoption are higher than those before IFRS adoption.  
 
The univariate test results for these variables pre- and post-IFRS adoption are reported in Table 5. Compared to 
companies without SPCs, companies reporting at least one SPC show higher LEV and lower INTCOV. In addition, 
companies with SPCs have lower RISK, a greater proportion of CLTD, higher ETR, and greater INTAN than 
companies without SPCs.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 All (N=15,068) Pre_IFRS(N=9,207) Post_IFRS(N=5,861) Mean Median Max Min SD Mean Median Mean Median 
SPC_NUM 0.007 0.000 7.000 0.000 0.152 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 
SPC_DUM 0.004 0.000 1.000 0.059 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 
LEV 0.474 0.473 1.534 0.033 0.214 0.475 0.471 0.471 0.475 
INTCOV 119.644 2.389 6399.857 -187.202 714.806 127.429 2.073 107.417 2.934 
DEBTISS 0.013 0.000 1.043 -1.056 0.259 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.000 
STOCKISS 0.043 0.000 0.889 -0.052 0.139 0.056 0.000 0.023 0.000 
RISK 5.648 6.000 10.000 1.000 2.738 5.530 6.000 5.834 6.000 
FUND -0.044 -0.012 0.336 -0.893 0.166 -0.058 -0.013 -0.023 -0.010 
CLTD 0.032 0.008 0.324 0.000 0.053 0.032 0.008 0.032 0.008 
STER 0.133 0.178 1.288 -1.655 0.341 0.130 0.174 0.137 0.181 
INTAN 0.037 0.012 0.375 -0.011 0.065 0.033 0.007 0.044 0.018 
DIRIND 0.126 0.125 0.429 0.000 0.111 0.112 0.105 0.147 0.143 
INDSH 0.157 0.113 0.569 0.000 0.165 0.147 0.080 0.172 0.148 
LnSIZE 25.607 25.317 30.705 22.886 1.481 25.405 25.108 25.925 25.635 
INDU_PERC 0.003 0.001 0.063 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 5. Univariate Tests of Explanatory Variables by Use of SPC 
 
Companies without SPCs Companies with SPCs 
Pred. 
Sign 
Diff. Test Diff. Test 
Mean Median Mean Median (T-Test) 
(Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
Test) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2) 
LEV 0.473 0.472 0.718 0.715 + 8.347*** 8.564*** 
INTCOV 120.062 2.411 1.466 0.860 - -1.206 -2.737*** 
DEBTISS 0.013 0.000 -0.004 0.025 + -0.456 0.643 
STOCKISS 0.043 0.000 0.004 0.000 + -2.069** -0.411 
RISK 5.656 6.000 3.415 3.000 ? -5.955*** -5.960*** 
FUND -0.044 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 - 1.564 1.126 
CLTD 0.032 0.008 0.115 0.107 + 11.449*** 9.977*** 
STER 0.133 0.178 0.205 0.228 + 1.537 2.511** 
INTAN 0.037 0.012 0.043 0.025 + 0.587 2.464** 
DIRIND 0.126 0.125 0.132 0.089 ? 0.433 -0.061 
INDSH 0.157 0.114 0.044 0.006 ? -5.000*** -3.664*** 
LnSIZE 25.595 25.313 29.001 29.361 + 16.870*** 11.021*** 
INDU_PERC 0.003 0.001 0.023 0.005 + 18.349*** 8.441*** 
N 15,015  53     
Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Table 6. Univariate Tests of Explanatory Variables by Use of SPCs: Pre_IFRS vs. Post IFRS 
Panel A: Univariate Tests for Pre_IFRS 
 
Companies without SPCs Companies with SPCs 
Pred. 
Diff. 
Diff. Test Diff. Test 
Mean Median Mean Median (T-Test) (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2) 
LEV 0.475 0.470 0.702 0.704 + 6.300*** 6.740*** 
INTCOV 127.935 2.084 1.904 1.207 - -1.015 -1.630*** 
DEBTISS 0.018 0.000 0.021 0.025 + 0.055 0.497 
STOCKISS 0.056 0.000 0.004 0.000 + -1.927* -0.604 
RISK 5.538 6.000 3.378 3.000 ? -4.737*** -4.757*** 
FUND -0.058 -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 - 1.522 1.107 
CLTD 0.032 0.008 0.103 0.104 + 8.179*** 7.982*** 
STER 0.130 0.174 0.255 0.246 + 2.251** 2.938*** 
INTAN 0.033 0.007 0.036 0.018 + 0.285 1.937* 
DIRIND 0.112 0.105 0.147 0.100 ? 1.904* 1.728* 
INDSH 0.147 0.080 0.052 0.019 ? -3.513*** -1.977** 
LnSIZE 25.392 25.104 28.559 28.590 + 13.232*** 9.063*** 
INDU_PERC 0.003 0.001 0.018 0.002 + 11.647*** 5.567*** 
N 9,170  37     
 
Panel B: Univariate Tests for Post_IFRS 
 
Companies without SPCs Companies with SPCs 
Pred. 
Diff. 
Diff. Test Diff. Test 
Mean Median Mean Median (T-Test) (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2) 
LEV 0.470 0.474 0.757 0.827 + 5.574*** 5.288*** 
INTCOV 107.709 2.938 0.452 0.262 - -0.661 -2.337** 
DEBTISS 0.004 0.000 -0.060 0.033 + -1.078 0.384 
STOCKISS 0.023 0.000 0.003 0.000 + -0.978 0.116 
RISK 5.840 6.000 3.500 3.000 ? -3.499*** -3.417*** 
FUND -0.023 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 - 0.632 0.478 
CLTD 0.032 0.008 0.145 0.130 + 8.409*** 6.050*** 
STER 0.137 0.181 0.087 0.191 + -0.580 0.129 
INTAN 0.044 0.018 0.057 0.048 + 0.818 2.502** 
DIRIND 0.147 0.143 0.099 0.080 ? -1.813* -2.572** 
INDSH 0.173 0.148 0.025 0.000 ? -3.604*** -3.378*** 
LnSIZE 25.914 25.630 30.021 30.016 + 11.469*** 6.606*** 
INDU_PERC 0.003 0.001 0.034 0.034 + 15.710*** 6.972*** 
N 5,845  16     
Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
These differences support our hypothesis that companies create SPCs for both financial reporting and economic 
purposes. The lower RISK of companies with SPCs stems from the condition of company credit that allows 
corporations to create SPCs (Korean ABS Act). Also, companies with at least one SPC show higher LnSIZE and 
INDU_PERC than companies without SPCs, indicating that SPC use is associated with company size and industry 
characteristics.   
 
Table 6 reports univariate test results for the independent and control variables by the use of SPCs and the adoption 
of the IFRS. Similar to Table 5, Table 6 shows that companies arrange SPCs for both financial reporting and economic 
purposes before and after adoption of the IFRS. 
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4.2 Regression Analysis Results 
 
In this section, we run Tobit and logit models to investigate the determinants of using SPCs. Table 7 shows the analysis 
results. The coefficient on LEV is significantly positive for both SPC_NUM and SPC_DUM, whereas the coefficient 
on INTCOV is marginally negative only for SPC_NUM. We interpret this result to indicate that companies with 
greater leverage are more likely to use SPCs to avoid violation of debt covenants. However, we do not find that 
companies have incentives to manage financial statements before they acquire outside financing because the 
coefficients for DEBTISS and STOCKISS are not significant in either analysis. 
 
In terms of economic motivation variables, we find a significantly negative coefficient on RISK and a significantly 
positive coefficient on CLTD, indicating that use of SPCs is more prevalent among companies with low risk and high 
demand to repay funds. 
 
For the control variables, LnSIZE and INDU_PERC are positive and significant. These results show that larger 
companies are more likely to use SPCs, and that companies are affected in their use of SPCs by industry practices. 
 
For RISK, INTAN, DIRIND, and INDSH, our results differ from those of Feng et al. (2009). The coefficient of RISK 
is significantly negative in our study, but not in Feng et al. (2009), because we use SPCs established under the ABS 
Act, which permits only companies with good credit to create SPCs. Also, we do not find significant relationships 
between the use of SPCs and INTAN, DIRIND, or INDSH. These results might be due to differences between Korean 
and US companies in tax planning and the role of boards of directors. 
 
In summary, our regression results overall support hypothesis 1 that the use of SPCs is motivated by financial reporting 
and economic considerations. 
 
 
Table 7. Analysis Results for Determinants of the Use of SPC 
Variables Dependent Variable=SPC_NUM Dependent Variable=SPC_DUM Beta t- value Beta z- value 
Intercept 3.8815 8.372*** -27.2072 -8.712*** 
LEV 6.4278 3.304*** 4.0417 3.801*** 
INTCOV -0.0279 -1.656* -0.0146 -1.294 
DEBTISS -1.1668 -1.166 -0.6729 -1.121 
STOCKISS -8.5680 -0.941 -4.3969 -0.917 
RISK -0.6602 -4.096*** -0.3874 -4.421*** 
FUND -0.3324 -0.136 0.1237 0.090 
CLTD 15.3176 3.556*** 8.9072 3.822*** 
ETR 0.5500 0.754 0.4368 0.955 
INTAN 5.3103 1.358 3.2037 1.433 
DIRIND 3.7901 1.716* 2.0588 1.627 
INDSH -4.1043 -1.326 -2.4861 -1.274 
LnSIZE 1.2869 5.764*** 0.7442 7.107*** 
INDU_PERC 162.2874 4.621*** 99.8379 5.817*** 
Chi² 329.395*** 325.856*** 
Pseudo R² 0.375 0.462 
N 15,068 15,068 
Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
However, those determinants for the use of SPCs change with the adoption of the IFRS, as presented in Table 8.  
In particular, whereas the coefficient of LEV before IFRS adoption is significantly positive, after the adoption of the 
IFRS, it is not.  
 
That is consistent with our conjecture that sponsors can no longer discretionally manage their debt ratio because, after 
IFRS adoption, they must consolidate their SPCs’ financial statements into their own financial statements. As a result, 
the adoption of the IFRS diminishes the financial reporting motivation for sponsoring SPCs. 
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However, the significance of the coefficients for RISK and CLTD before and after IFRS adoption is not qualitatively 
different, indicating that, even after IFRS adoption, sponsors use SPCs to raise capital. For companies that want to 
raise funds at lower cost, an SPC is still a popular financing vehicle. 
 
The results reported in Table 8 support hypothesis 2 by showing that the use of SPCs is not related to financial 
reporting motivation after adoption of the IFRS. 
 
 
Table 8. Analysis Results of the periods before and after IFRS adoption 
Variables 
Dependent Variable=SPC_NUM Dependent Variable=SPC_DUM 
Pre_IFRS Post_IFRS Pre_IFRS Post_IFRS 
Beta Beta Beta Beta 
(t-value) (t- value) (z- value) (z- value) 
Intercept 2.4983 4.9633 -24.9268 -69.4284 (6.783)*** (4.744)*** (-7.423)*** (-3.888)*** 
LEV 4.6892 5.9238 4.4467 3.2342 (3.174)*** (0.667) (3.577)*** (0.848) 
INTCOV -0.0146 -0.1186 -0.0117 -0.0457 (-1.092) (-1.543) (-0.876) (-1.303) 
DEBTISS -0.8508 -1.4418 -0.7348 -0.2996 (-1.167) (-0.350) (-1.050) (-0.174) 
STOCKISS -4.9257 -120.3938 -3.6790 -57.5365 (-0.962) (-1.632) (-0.947) (-2.160)** 
RISK -0.3953 -1.3435 -0.3498 -0.6476 (-3.284)*** (-2.374)** (-3.388)*** (-2.764)*** 
FUND -0.1574 -15.5122 0.4603 -8.7094 (-0.097) (-1.054) (0.297) (-1.479) 
CLTD 9.5763 55.1868 8.6311 22.9205 (2.937)*** (2.643)*** (3.107)*** (2.797)*** 
ETR 1.1422 -2.9555 1.1205 -1.3064 (1.847)* (-1.500) (2.024)** (-1.614) 
INTAN 1.4557 22.4747 1.8554 9.2227 (0.438) (1.900)* (0.624) (1.903)* 
DIRIND 3.2769 -0.1038 2.7513 -0.3642 (2.037)** (-0.013) (1.959)* (-0.102) 
INDSH -2.1210 -22.0149 -1.7954 -9.3744 (-1.025) (-1.087) (-0.879) (-1.076) 
LnSIZE 0.6974 5.5224 0.6423 2.0949 (4.570)*** (3.178)*** (5.759)*** (3.657)*** 
INDU_PERC 105.5369 242.5208 95.2336 130.8278 (3.929)*** (1.980)** (4.632)*** (2.646)*** 
Chi² 202.771*** 153.145*** 194.812*** 155.519*** 
Pseudo R² 0.354 0.526 0.404 0.704 
N 9,207 5,861 9,207 5,861 
Please refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We examine which factors motivate sponsoring companies to use SPCs and whether those motivations differ before 
and after IFRS adoption. We use firm-year observations listed on KSE or KOSDAQ from 2004 to 2014. Our results, 
similar to those of prior research, show that the use of SPCs is motivated by financial reporting and economic 
considerations.  
 
However, after adoption of the IFRS, the coefficient of leverage stops being significant, whereas the coefficients of 
firm risk, supply of internal funds, and repayable debt do not differ qualitatively before and after IFRS adoption.  
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These results indicate that the financial reporting motivations for the use of SPCs disappear with IFRS adoption, while 
economic motivations continue to exist. In sum, since the adoption of the IFRS, companies use SPCs for economic 
reasons rather than financial reporting reasons. 
 
We extend prior research by investigating whether the determinants for creating SPCs change due to adoption of the 
IFRS using a sample of Korean listed companies. We compare the motivation for SPC use under different accounting 
regulations. Our results show that financial reporting motivations disappear after IFRS adoption, which means that 
the IFRS regulations significantly affect the motivations to use SPCs.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the determinants of the use of SPCs and the consequences of 
IFRS adoption as the accounting environment by reporting the effect of the IFRS adoption on those determinants. Our 
findings suggest that the IFRS plays a crucial role in undermining the motivation to improperly use SPCs. Our 
examination of the role of IFRS regulation differs from previous studies by also analyzing SPC use in the non-IFRS 
environment. 
 
We use a sample of Korean listed companies with SPCs under the ABS Act. However, it remains to be shown how 
companies create SPCs differently under other legal regimes. We leave this for future research. 
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